File "VerificationController.php"
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<?php
declare( strict_types=1 );
namespace Automattic\WooCommerce\Internal\CustomerEmailVerification;
/**
* Drives the customer email-verification UI on My Account and processes its verify-links.
*
* Verification uses a one-time link emailed to the customer. Opening the link verifies the address
* directly — but ONLY when the request is authenticated as the link's target user. The login gate is
* the control, not the HTTP verb.
*
* This intentionally mirrors WordPress core's own email-change confirmation links, which likewise
* complete a sensitive change on an authenticated GET carrying an unguessable secret — no interstitial,
* form, or nonce — relying on the auth gate plus the secret:
*
* - Administration email change: wp-admin/options.php (`adminhash`) —
* https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress/blob/master/wp-admin/options.php
* - Profile email change: wp-admin/user-edit.php (`newuseremail`) —
* https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress/blob/master/wp-admin/user-edit.php
*
* What makes the link safe:
*
* - A prefetch (email client or security scanner) is never logged in as the customer, so it can never
* reach the verify branch — it only ever sees the My Account login. It cannot consume the key.
* - The key is a one-time, time-limited secret bound by hash to the account's current email, so it is
* inert without an authenticated session as the target: a leaked key cannot be spent by anyone who is
* not already that user (which is also why, like core, it is safe to carry the key in the URL).
* - An attacker who registered an account with someone else's email can't read the victim's inbox, so
* never receives the link; and the victim can only reach a logged-in-as-target state by resetting the
* password, which invalidates the attacker's session.
*
* No auth cookie is ever minted by the link (that would be exploitable as login CSRF): a logged-out
* visitor is shown the My Account login on the link itself, and signing in returns them to the link
* (the verify params are preserved in its URL) to complete it as themselves.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*/
class VerificationController {
/**
* Nonce action used to protect the send-verification request.
*/
private const SEND_NONCE_ACTION = 'woocommerce-send-verification-email';
/**
* Query param used to trigger the send-verification request.
*/
private const SEND_PARAM = 'wc_send_verification';
/**
* Query param carrying the plaintext verification key.
*/
private const KEY_PARAM = 'wc_verify_email_key';
/**
* Query param carrying the target user ID.
*/
private const USER_PARAM = 'wc_verify_email_user';
/**
* Query param carrying a one-off result code to print as a notice on the account page.
*/
private const NOTICE_PARAM = 'wc_verify_notice';
/**
* Minimum seconds between sends (rate limit).
*/
private const SEND_RATE_LIMIT = 60;
/**
* Verification service.
*
* @var EmailVerificationService
*/
private $service;
/**
* Constructor. Registers hooks.
*/
public function __construct() {
add_action( 'template_redirect', array( $this, 'maybe_process_request' ) );
add_action( 'woocommerce_before_account_orders', array( $this, 'print_result_notice' ), 5 );
add_action( 'woocommerce_before_account_orders', array( $this, 'render_prompt' ) );
}
/**
* Inject dependencies.
*
* @internal
* @param EmailVerificationService $service Verification service.
*/
final public function init( EmailVerificationService $service ): void {
$this->service = $service;
}
/**
* Route an incoming request: a send request or an opened verify-link.
*
* Opening the emailed link is a GET, which email clients and security scanners routinely prefetch.
* Verification is gated on authentication ({@see self::handle_verify_link()}), so a prefetch — always
* logged out — only ever reaches the My Account login and can never consume the key.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*/
public function maybe_process_request(): void {
if ( isset( $_GET[ self::SEND_PARAM ] ) ) { // phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended
$this->handle_send_request();
return;
}
// No nonce on the verify-link: like WordPress core's email-change confirmation links, the
// unguessable one-time key is the CSRF defence and the login gate is the authority.
// phpcs:disable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended
if ( isset( $_GET[ self::KEY_PARAM ], $_GET[ self::USER_PARAM ] ) ) {
$this->handle_verify_link(
absint( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::USER_PARAM ] ) ),
sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::KEY_PARAM ] ) )
);
}
// phpcs:enable WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended
}
/**
* Verify the address from an opened verify-link — gated on being logged in as the link's target user.
*
* The login gate is the control: verification, and key consumption, happen ONLY on the path where the
* request is authenticated as $user_id. A prefetch or any logged-out visit is shown the My Account
* login and never touches the key; a visitor logged in as a different account is refused without
* consuming it. This is the same shape as WordPress core's email-change confirmation links
* (wp-admin/options.php `adminhash`, wp-admin/user-edit.php `newuseremail`): a sensitive change
* completed on an authenticated GET carrying an unguessable secret.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*
* @param int $user_id Target user ID from the link.
* @param string $key Plaintext verification key from the link.
* @return void
*/
private function handle_verify_link( int $user_id, string $key ): void {
// The key rides in the URL, so keep this response off caches and out of third-party Referer
// headers (the logged-out branch renders a themed front-end page that may load such assets).
nocache_headers();
if ( ! headers_sent() ) {
header( 'Referrer-Policy: no-referrer' );
}
$current_user_id = get_current_user_id();
// Logged out (including any prefetcher): never verify, never consume the key. Render the My
// Account login; the verify params stay in the URL so signing in returns here to complete it.
if ( ! $current_user_id ) {
wc_add_notice( __( 'You need to be logged in to confirm your email address.', 'woocommerce' ), 'notice' );
return;
}
// Logged in as someone else: refuse rather than silently switching accounts. The key is untouched.
if ( $current_user_id !== $user_id ) {
$this->redirect_with_result( 'mismatch' );
}
// Authenticated as the target — the only path that consumes the key and verifies.
if ( $this->process_verification( $user_id, $key ) ) {
$this->redirect_with_result( 'confirmed' );
}
// Already verified (e.g. the link re-opened after the key was spent): land on Orders quietly,
// without repeating the success notice for a confirmation that already happened.
if ( $this->service->is_verified( $user_id ) ) {
wp_safe_redirect( wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) );
exit;
}
// Authenticated as the target, but the key is invalid or expired and they are not verified.
$this->redirect_with_result( 'expired' );
}
/**
* Handle a request to send (or resend) the verification email, triggered by the My Account prompt.
*
* Verifies the nonce, applies a rate-limit (does not re-send within the window), dispatches the
* email, and redirects to the orders section, where the prompt points the customer to their inbox.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*/
public function handle_send_request(): void {
$user_id = get_current_user_id();
if ( ! $user_id ) {
return;
}
$nonce = isset( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ? sanitize_text_field( wp_unslash( $_GET['_wpnonce'] ) ) : '';
if ( ! wp_verify_nonce( $nonce, self::SEND_NONCE_ACTION ) ) {
$this->redirect_with_result( 'invalid' );
}
// Only send a fresh link once the last one is outside the rate-limit window; otherwise the
// existing link still stands and the prompt continues to point the customer to their inbox.
$seconds_since = $this->service->seconds_since_last_key( $user_id );
if ( null === $seconds_since || $seconds_since >= self::SEND_RATE_LIMIT ) {
$this->send_verification_email( $user_id );
$this->redirect_with_result( 'sent' );
}
$this->redirect_with_result( 'throttled' );
}
/**
* Return whether the verification prompt should be shown for the current user.
*
* This cannot depend on whether matching guest orders exist, since that would disclose order
* existence before the customer proves they control the email address.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*
* @return bool
*/
public function should_show_prompt(): bool {
$user_id = get_current_user_id();
if ( ! $user_id || $this->service->is_verified( $user_id ) ) {
return false;
}
$email_setting = get_option( 'woocommerce_customer_verify_email_settings', array() );
$email_enabled = 'yes' === ( $email_setting['enabled'] ?? 'yes' );
$should_show = $email_enabled && wc_string_to_bool( get_option( 'woocommerce_enable_guest_checkout' ) );
// A temporary-password account already has a set-password link (which also verifies on use),
// surfaced by the temporary-password notice, so skip a second prompt alongside it.
$should_show = $should_show && ! get_user_option( 'default_password_nag', $user_id );
/**
* Filter whether to show the verification prompt for an unverified user.
*
* @since 11.1.0
*
* @param bool $should_show Whether to show the prompt, before this filter runs.
* @param int $user_id The WordPress user ID of the customer.
*/
return (bool) apply_filters( 'woocommerce_customer_email_verification_should_show_prompt', $should_show, $user_id );
}
/**
* Render the verification prompt notice on the My Account "Orders" panel.
*
* Within the rate-limit window a link was sent recently, so the prompt points the customer to their
* inbox and offers no immediate resend; otherwise it carries the "confirm email" call to action.
*
* @internal
* @since 11.0.0
*/
public function render_prompt(): void {
if ( ! $this->should_show_prompt() ) {
return;
}
$user_id = get_current_user_id();
$seconds_since = $this->service->seconds_since_last_key( $user_id );
if ( null !== $seconds_since && $seconds_since <= self::SEND_RATE_LIMIT ) {
// A just-sent/throttled result notice (from the redirect) already points to the inbox this
// page load, so don't print a second "check your inbox" alongside it.
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- display-only, no state change.
if ( ! isset( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ) {
wc_print_notice(
esc_html__( 'Confirm your email address to check for past orders. A confirmation link was sent recently — please check your inbox.', 'woocommerce' ),
'notice'
);
}
return;
}
$send_url = wp_nonce_url(
add_query_arg( self::SEND_PARAM, '1', wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) ),
self::SEND_NONCE_ACTION
);
$notice = sprintf(
'<a href="%2$s" class="button wc-forward">%3$s</a> %1$s',
esc_html__( 'Confirm your email address to check for past orders and link them to your account.', 'woocommerce' ),
esc_url( $send_url ),
esc_html__( 'Confirm email address', 'woocommerce' )
);
wc_print_notice( $notice, 'notice' );
}
/**
* Print the one-off result notice carried by the {@see self::NOTICE_PARAM} query arg, if any.
*
* Send/confirm actions redirect here with a result code rather than queuing a session notice, so the
* page shows exactly the current request's outcome — re-running an action can't stack notices.
*
* @internal
* @since 11.0.0
*/
public function print_result_notice(): void {
// phpcs:ignore WordPress.Security.NonceVerification.Recommended -- display-only, no state change.
$code = isset( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ? sanitize_key( wp_unslash( $_GET[ self::NOTICE_PARAM ] ) ) : '';
$notice = $this->result_notice( $code );
if ( null !== $notice ) {
wc_print_notice( esc_html( $notice[0] ), $notice[1] );
}
}
/**
* Map a redirect result code to its [ message, notice type ], or null for an unknown code.
*
* @param string $code Result code from a send/confirm redirect.
* @return array{0: string, 1: string}|null
*/
private function result_notice( string $code ): ?array {
switch ( $code ) {
case 'sent':
return array( __( 'A confirmation link has been sent to your email address. Please check your inbox.', 'woocommerce' ), 'success' );
case 'throttled':
return array( __( 'A confirmation link was sent recently. Please check your inbox, or wait a moment before requesting a new one.', 'woocommerce' ), 'notice' );
case 'confirmed':
return array( __( 'Your email address has been confirmed.', 'woocommerce' ), 'success' );
case 'expired':
return array( __( 'This confirmation link is invalid or has expired. Please request a new one.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' );
case 'mismatch':
return array( __( 'Unable to confirm this email while you are logged in to a different account. Please log out and open the link again.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' );
case 'invalid':
return array( __( 'Invalid request. Please try again.', 'woocommerce' ), 'error' );
default:
return null;
}
}
/**
* Redirect to the orders section carrying a one-off result code, then exit.
*
* @param string $code Result code understood by {@see self::result_notice()}.
* @return never
*/
private function redirect_with_result( string $code ): void {
wp_safe_redirect( add_query_arg( self::NOTICE_PARAM, $code, wc_get_account_endpoint_url( 'orders' ) ) );
exit;
}
/**
* Validate a key and verify the user.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*
* @param int $user_id User ID.
* @param string $key Plaintext verification key.
* @return bool True when verification succeeded.
*/
public function process_verification( int $user_id, string $key ): bool {
if ( ! $user_id || '' === $key ) {
return false;
}
if ( ! $this->service->check_verification_key( $user_id, $key ) ) {
return false;
}
$this->service->mark_verified( $user_id );
return true;
}
/**
* Send (or resend) a verification email to a user.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*
* @param int $user_id User ID.
*/
public function send_verification_email( int $user_id ): void {
$user = get_user_by( 'id', $user_id );
if ( ! $user ) {
return;
}
$verify_url = $this->service->build_verification_url( $user_id );
WC()->mailer();
/**
* Triggers sending of the customer email-verification email.
*
* @param int $user_id The WordPress user ID of the customer.
* @param string $verify_url The one-time verification URL to include in the email.
*
* @since 11.0.0
*/
do_action( 'woocommerce_customer_verify_email_notification', $user_id, $verify_url );
}
}